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 Abstract 
Economic and welfare program factors affect the well-being of low-income families 
and their labor supply decisions. This study uses data from the U.S. Survey of Income 
and Program Participation. A nested logit model is estimated to explain the joint 
decisions to participate in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the 
labor market for the population of families potentially eligible for TANF. The empirical 
findings indicate that higher wages increase labor and decrease welfare program 
participation; an increase in nonlabor income decreases both labor market and welfare 
participation.  
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF JOINT DECISIONS ON  
LABOR SUPPLY AND WELFARE PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
Between 1965 and 1985 the United States experienced a large increase in the 
caseload of welfare programs. There are many explanations for the high caseload level, 
and these include long-term welfare dependency and work disincentives. In response, 
recent state and federal welfare reforms have been designed to increase work 
participation among welfare recipients. The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) enacted in 1996 brought major changes in 
the scope, structure, and impact of programs targeted to the low-income population, 
including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the Food Stamp Program, 
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), child welfare, and child support. 
Following the introduction of PRWORA, the number of welfare recipients declined 
across the nation. Both the reforms introduced through PRWORA and America’s 
growing economy contributed to the declining welfare rolls.  
Linkages among social assistance programs have significant effects on the behavior 
of low-income individuals and families. This study examines the effects of cash transfers 
on labor supply and welfare participation decisions in order to better understand factors 
affecting welfare program and labor market activities of the poor. Many researchers have 
analyzed the effects of government transfer programs on labor supply decisions among 
the low-income population (see Moffitt 1992). Much of the empirical work provides 
insights on how welfare transfers affect labor supply decisions of low-income families 
and has focused on either females or married couples.  
For example, Keane and Moffitt (1998) use a structural model to examine work and 
multiple welfare program participation decisions among families headed by single adult 
females. Hagstrom (1996) examines the effect of the Food Stamp Program on intra-
family labor supply and program participation decisions. Married couples simultaneously 
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choose the labor supply of the husband and wife and whether to participate in the Food 
Stamp Program. Hagstrom estimates a nested multinomial logit model and uses data from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). He found smaller labor supply 
effects for married couples to changes in the food stamp benefit compared with those of 
single parents. He also found program participation by married couples to be responsive 
to changes in food stamp benefits. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the 1996 welfare reforms on 
the labor supply decisions of low-income families. There are three types of families: 
two-parent families, male-headed families, and female-headed families. The core of the 
transfer system for the low-income population of the nonelderly and nondisabled 
includes AFDC (now Temporary Assistance to Needy Families [TANF]), the Food 
Stamp Program, Medicaid, and public housing. Among these, the TANF program is the 
most widely known cash transfer program for the poor. This study uses data from the 
SIPP to analyze labor market and TANF participation decisions among all low-wealth 
families in the United States. A static model of family behavior is developed in which 
work and program participation is chosen to maximize a family utility function given 
resource constraints. The model is used to explain the joint decision to participate in 
TANF and the labor market for the population of families eligible for TANF. The paper 
provides two approaches to explaining joint decisions of families. First, we estimate a 
bivariate probit model of participation in the labor force and TANF program. Second, 
we estimate a nested logit model that incorporates simultaneous decisions on labor 
market and TANF participation.  
 
TANF Program 
The PRWORA gives the states a fundamental role in assisting poor families. Under 
TANF, the eligibility rules and benefits differ across states. To be eligible for TANF, an 
applicant family must pass both nonfinancial tests based on the demographic 
characteristics of the family and its members and financial tests based on the family’s 
income and asset holdings. At the most basic level of nonfinancial tests, the family must 
include a child or, in some states, a pregnant woman. If the head of the family is a 
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teenager, she may or may not be eligible to receive a benefit on her own. In most states, 
she is eligible only if she is living with her parents.  
The financial tests require that an applicant family must have sufficiently low 
income and asset levels. The asset limits that states have adopted under TANF differ 
greatly by state. Thirty-nine states have increased the asset limit for recipients above the 
$1,000 limit allowed under AFDC. Twenty-two states allow recipients to accumulate 
additional savings in a restricted savings account set aside for a specific purpose allowed 
by the state. If the family’s total assets exceed the amounts determined by the state, the 
family is ineligible for TANF.  
Once the family has passed the state’s asset tests, its available income is computed 
for eligibility purposes. States use the total gross income calculated from the unit’s 
earned and unearned income as a starting point for income eligibility tests (Rowe 2000). 
Many states now impose just one income test on applicants; however, others use a 
combination of a gross income test, gross earnings test, and/or net income test. Net 
income tests require that net family income not exceed a maximum benefit level that 
varies by family size and state of residence. Net income is calculated by subtracting the 
state’s earned income disregards from the unit’s gross earned income and then adding to 
this amount the unit’s unearned income. The net income is then compared to an income 
standard determined by the state. If the net income is less than the standard, then a benefit 
is calculated. 
Although states use many different formulas to determine net income, there are 
general rules that most states apply. All but two states allow recipients to disregard a 
portion of their earned income before benefit computation and vary the units’ benefits by 
income. In more straightforward calculations, net income is subtracted from a state-
determined standard, the so-called payment standard, which varies by family size. The 
benefit paid is the difference. 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Model 
Theoretical Model 
The family head is assumed to choose labor supply and welfare (here, TANF) 
participation simultaneously to maximize the family’s utility subject to its budget 
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constraint. Assume that a family’s utility is a function of leisure time and disposable 
income and is represented by 
 ),,( δYHUU =  (1) 
where H is monthly hours of work supplied by family, Y is monthly disposable income, 
and δ  represents preferences for receiving a TANF benefit. Monthly disposable income 
may be written as the following budget constraint: 
 ]),([),( CNHBPNwHPHY TT −++=  (2) 
where w is the hourly wage rate, N is nonlabor income, TP  is defined to be an indicator 
equal to 1 if the family head participates in the TANF program and 0 otherwise, )(⋅B  is 
the TANF benefit given the family’s labor supply, and C is the monetary cost of 
participating in the TANF program. The family head is assumed to simultaneously 
choose H and TP  that maximizes his or her utility given in equation (1) subject to the 
budget constraint given in equation (2). That is, the family head chooses the (H, TP ) 
combination that gives the greatest indirect utility.  
Participation in the welfare program is not costless. There are costs associated with 
the application process and with application itself. The costs include the transportation 
and time costs of applying for the program and some compliance costs while 
participating. These costs vary by individual family and by location. However, there are 
benefits with TANF participation. A family with no income is eligible to receive the 
maximum TANF grant. For a family with income, the TANF benefits are calculated as 
the difference between the maximum benefit and net family income. The TANF benefits 
are calculated according to the following formula: 
 ]}))(([,min{ CCBRRHEwHNGPB TT −−+−= if wH + N < 1.85L (3) 
where TB  is the monthly TANF benefit, P is the maximum permitted payment in the 
state, TG  is the maximum amount paid or pay standard, )(⋅E  is the earnings disregard, 
BRR is the benefit reduction rate, CC is child care deductions, and L is living costs. The 
variables P, TG , L, E, and BRR vary by state and family size.    
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As Figure 1 shows, the labor supply decision depends on the TANF benefit through 
its effect on the budget constraint, and TANF participation depends on labor supply 
through its effect on the TANF benefit. Therefore the TANF participation and labor 
supply decisions are both endogenous and interdependent.  
Empirical Model 
The choice set is simplified by assuming that each family chooses to work or not to 
work under the labor supply decision and to participate or not to participate under the 
TANF participation decision. The resulting choice set has four alternatives, each of which 
is a combination of the labor supply and TANF status. Each alternative provides indirect 
utility ltV . The subscripts l and t combined denote an alternative, which is a combination 
of the labor supply decision and TANF participation decision. The family chooses the 
alternative lt such that )'(ltlt VV ≥  for all ( )lt lt′ ≠ .  
The indirect utility ltV  is assumed to be a function of known, measured variables and 
an unobserved stochastic component. Two types of measured variables exist in the 
context of the TANF participation and labor supply decision problem. The first type 
varies across alternatives and is called a choice-specific variable or attributes of the 
choices. The choice-specific variables include the TANF benefit for different 
combinations of labor supply and wages across hours of work choices. The second type 
varies by family rather than by alternative and is called an individual-specific variable or 
  
 
FIGURE 1: Simultaneity of labor supply and TANF participation decisions 
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characteristics of the individual. The individual-specific variables include information on 
the family head’s age, education, marital status, number of children, and so forth.  
The stochastic error component captures the effect of unmeasured variables and 
unobserved differences in preferences across families. Given the form of utility function 
and the probability distribution of the stochastic term, the probability that the family will 
choose alternative wt can be written ]Pr[Pr )'(ltltlt VV ≥= , for all ( )lt lt′ ≠ .  
Model I: Bivariate Probit Model 
Several models are available for estimating the described random utility model based 
on different assumptions about the stochastic component of indirect utility function, ltV  
(Green).1 One model for incorporating simultaneous decisions on labor market and 
TANF participation is a bivariate probit model. Define PL and PT as participation in the 
labor market and the TANF program, respectively. All families are then classified into 
four mutually exclusive regimes based on the discrete choice outcome on PL and PT: 
R1: PL = PT = 1 (those who participate in the labor market and TANF) 
R2: PL =1 and PT = 0 (those who participate in the labor market but not in TANF) 
R3: PL = 0 and PT = 1 (those who participate in TANF but not in the labor market) 
R4: PL = PT = 0 (those who do not participate in the labor market or TANF) 
All observations have a nonzero probability of being assigned to one of four regimes. 
This probability can be evaluated with the following bivariate probability statements: 
 M11≡P(R1)=P(PL = 1,PT = 1)=P[PL*=θL′ ZL+µL>0, PT*=θT′ ZT+µT>0]  (4) 
 M10≡P(R2)=P(PL = 1,PT = 0)=P[PL*=θL′ ZL+µL>0, PT*=θT′ ZT+µT≤0]  (5) 
 M01≡P(R3)=P(PL = 0,PT = 1)=P[PL*=θL′ ZL+µL≤0, PT*=θT′ ZT+µT>0]  (6) 
 M00≡P(R4)=P(PL = 0,PT = 0)=P[PL*=θL′ ZL+µL≤0, PT*=θT′ ZT+µT≤0]  (7) 
Although PL* and PT* are unobservable variables, we can observe the dummy 
variables PL and PT such that PL=1 if PL*>0 and PL=0 otherwise, and PT=1 if PT>0 and 
PT=0 otherwise. Define ZL and ZT as vectors of exogenous variables, θL and θT as 
parameter vectors, and µL and µT as disturbance terms. Maximum-likelihood estimation 
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of bivariate probit regressions are used to estimate θL and θT. These estimates are used to 
calculate the probabilities of statements (4)-(7). 
The empirical specification of the human-capital based wage equation is 
 wYXWLn εβββ +++= 210)(   (8) 
where X is a vector of exogenous variables including education, marital status, gender, 
race, and metro/nonmetro location of the family head; Y is a vector of other exogenous 
variables, including local unemployment rate, experience, and an interaction term 
between experience and education; and wε  is a normal random error. The wage equation 
also needs to be corrected for potential selection bias.   
Model II: Nested Logit Model 
A second model that is widely used in the discrete choice literature is the multino-
mial logit model (or conditional logit model), which can be easily estimated for large 
choice sets (Green 2000; Hensher and Green 2000). The multinomial logit model 
assumes that the stochastic errors are uncorrelated across alternatives. When the 
assumption on independence of irrelevant alternatives does not hold, a nested 
multinomial logit model can be used. The nested multinomial logit model allows the error 
terms to be correlated across alternatives in a group but to be independent of alternatives 
in a different group. Figure 2 shows the nesting structure of the model to be estimated. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Tree structure for nested logit model 
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The indirect utility function ltV  is decomposed into components in the following way: 
 ltlltltlt YYXXV εββαα ++++=  (9) 
where ltX  is a vector of observed attributes that vary across TANF participation 
alternatives, lY  is a vector of observed attributes that vary across the family’s labor 
supply alternatives, and the l and t take on values to indicate whether or not there is 
participation in the labor force (l) or in TANF (t). In addition to these choice-specific 
variables, we also include the vectors X and Y, which vary by individual family rather 
than by alternatives. 
In our specification, ltX  is a measure of the TANF benefit that varies across the 
family’s labor supply choices, and lY  is a vector of wage variables that differ across labor 
supply alternatives. The individual-specific characteristics include components of the 
budget constraint, variables that capture variations in preferences. The joint probability of 
choosing alternative lt can be written as  
 )()|(),( lPltPtlP =   (10) 
where )|( ltP  is the probability of choosing t conditional on the choice of l, and )(lP  is 
the marginal probability of choosing l for the family. If the ε  is extreme-value 
distributed, then the probabilities in equation (10) can be written as  
 ∑
∈
+
+=
Tt
tlt
tlt
XX
XXltP
'
)exp(
)exp(
)|( αα
αα
 (11) 
 ∑
∈
++
++=
Ll
llll
llll
IYY
IYY
lP
'
)exp(
)exp(
)( τββ
τββ
 (12) 
where  
 ∑
∈
+=
Tt
tltl XXI
'
)exp(log αα .  (13) 
 
An Empirical Analysis of Joint Decisions on Labor Supply and Welfare Participation / 9 
The term lI  is the inclusive value in the labor supply equation and can be interpreted 
as a measure of the sum of the utility for choice t given choice of l. The “nested logit” 
aspect of the model arises when the coefficients of the inclusive values lτ  differ from 1.  
To be consistent with the random utility model, the utility function for the four 
alternatives can be specified in the following way:  
 , , , , , ,
, , , ,
( ) ( ) ( )
 ( ) ( )
yy yy b yy r W l W t M l M t C l C t
N l N t U l U t yy
V B BRR W M C
N U
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
α β β γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ ε   
 ynlUlNlClMlWrynbynyn UNCMWBRRBV εγγγγγββα ++++++++= ,,,,,   
 nytUtNtCtMtWrnybnyny UNCMWBRRBV εγγγγγββα +++++++++= ,,,,,   
 nnrnnbnn BRRBV εββ ++=              (14) 
where ltB is the pay standard, BRR is the benefit reduction rate,
2 W is the predicted wage, 
M is a family head’s gender, C is the number of children in the family, N is nonlabor 
income to the family, and U is the state unemployment rate. 
 
Data and Estimation Results 
The effectiveness of welfare programs has been debated for a long time. The 
difficulty of evaluating these programs comes from the lack of appropriate data. The 
availability of the SIPP data now provides evidence for evaluating the efficacy of welfare 
programs. One of the major goals of SIPP is to examine interactions among transfer 
programs, labor force participation, and living arrangements because it contains detailed 
information about the characteristics of, and actual choices made by, both participants 
and nonparticipants. The 1996 SIPP (wave 3) data was used in this study.  
Only nonelderly (under 65 years of age), nondisabled family heads are included in 
the sample because both elderly and disabled people are eligible for other transfer 
programs. Family heads are also excluded if they are categorically ineligible for the 
TANF program, that is, if they do not have any children under age 18 in the family. In 
this study we assume that the family’s assets are exogenous. Therefore families with 
assets that exceed the asset limit, described in Table 1, are excluded from the sample. We 
do not use income eligibility in selecting the sample because hours of work is an 
endogenous variable, that is, the family head’s decision to earn an amount that causes the  
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TABLE 1. TANF asset limits 
State Asset Limits ($) State Asset Limits ($) 
Alabama 2,000 Mississippi 1,000 
Alaska 1,000 Missouri 5,000 
Arizona 2,000 Montana 3,000 
Arkansas 3,000 Nebraska 6,000 
California 2,000 Nevada 2,000 
Colorado 2,000 New Hampshire 2,000 
Connecticut 3,000 New Jersey 2,000 
Delaware 1,000 New Mexico 1,500 
Dist. of Colombia 1,000 New York 2,000 
Florida 2,000 North Carolina 3,000 
Georgia 1,000 North Dakota 5,000 
Hawaii 5,000 Ohio 1,000 
Idaho 2,000 Oklahoma 1,000 
Illinois 3,000 Oregon 2,500 
Indiana 1,500 Pennsylvania 1,000 
Iowa 5,000 Rhode Island 1,000 
Kansas 2,000 South Carolina 2,500 
Kentucky 2,000 South Dakota 2,000 
Louisiana 2,000 Tennessee 2,000 
Maine 2,000 Texas 2,000 
Maryland 2,000 Washington 1,000 
Massachusetts 2,500 West Virginia 2,000 
Michigan 3,000 Wisconsin 2,500 
Minnesota 5,000 Wyoming 2,500 
Source: Gallagher et al. 1998. 
 
family income to exceed the breakeven level is a matter of choice. We select whoever 
gets a higher wage as the family head in the case of married couple families, as it is more 
likely that the family member who receives a higher wage would work first. The resulting 
sample includes 6,404 families with low wealth. Of these, 58 percent are married couple 
families, and 78 percent live in metro areas. 
All the dependent variables are defined for the month of November 1996. A family is 
recorded as a TANF participant if a member reports receiving TANF support in the 
month. For the labor supply, a family head is classified as not working if he or she reports 
An Empirical Analysis of Joint Decisions on Labor Supply and Welfare Participation / 11 
working zero hours during the month and as working if he or she reports working at least 
one hour per week during the month. Variables used in our analysis include a set of 
demographic variables and a set of structural variables designed to capture differences in 
labor market conditions and transfer programs. The demographic variables for the family 
head include gender, education level, race, marital status, and experience, which is 
defined by age minus education minus 6. The set of individual characteristics include a 
metro variable that indicates that the family lives in a metro area versus nonmetro area, 
the state’s monthly unemployment rate, unearned income, the number of children under 
age 6, and program participation choices. The wage rate is predicted and then used in the 
following analysis. 
Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of variables. The payment 
standard is the maximum TANF grant per month a participant can get if he or she is 
eligible for TANF. The actual TANF benefit a person can get depends on his or her 
participation in the labor force and income eligibility.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of the dependent variables: labor market and welfare 
program participation. About 9 percent of the asset-eligible families receive a TANF 
grant, and 84 percent of them participate in the labor market. The workers are 
concentrated, at 81 percent of the sample, in the TANF nonparticipation cell. Ten percent 
of those in the sample do not work and do not participate in TANF; 6 percent do not work 
and participate in TANF; and 3 percent work and participate in TANF. 
Before the estimation of the bivariate probit model of labor force and welfare 
participation, we estimate a wage equation for the family heads (if single family) and 
spouse (for married family), and then use the predicted wage as an instrument of the 
actual wage. The estimates of the wage equation are reported in Table 4. Added 
experience increases the family head’s wage through increased labor productivity, 
holding other things equal. The wage equation is concave in relation to experience. One 
additional year of experience has the direct effect of increasing the wage by 5.4 percent. 
The findings on other variables are consistent with other studies. Being male increases 
the individual’s wage. Individuals living in metro areas receive higher wage rates than 
those living in nonmetro areas. 
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TABLE 2. Definitions, mean, and standard deviations of variables (N=6,404) 
Variable 
Mean (Std. 
deviation) Definition 
Age   36.09 (8.74) Age of family head 
Education   12.25 (2.66) Years of schooling of family head 
Male  0.45 (0.5) Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
family head is male 
Married  0.58 (0.49) Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
family head is married 
White  0.75 (0.43) Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
family head is white 
Metro  0.78 (0.41) Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
family head lives in metro 
Kids6  0.71 (0.83) Number of children under 6 
Experience  18.26 (9.05) Age-Education-6 
Unemployment rate  5.25 (1.05) Local state unemployment rate (%) 
Nonlabor income  128.68 (344.06) Family nonlabor income per month ($) 
Wage  9.46 (1.99) Predicted hourly wage ($) 
Payment standard  445.00 (213.00) Maximum TANF grant per month 
given participation ($) 
BRR  0.53 (0.18) The benefit reduction rate is the rate at 
which additional dollars of earned 
income reduce the amount 
transferred 
Labor force 
participation 
 0.84 (0.37) Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
family head works 
TANF participation  0.09 (0.29) Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
family head participates in TANF 
 
 
TABLE 3. Distribution of the sample by labor supply and welfare participation 
 Welfare Program (TANF)   
 Participation No participation All 
Work 199 3% 5,165 81% 5,364 84% 
Not work 397 6% 643 10% 1,040 16% 
All 596 9% 5,808 91% 6,404 100% 
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TABLE 4. Estimates of the log wage equation 
Variables Estimates 
Intercept  1.140 (0.062)*** 
Education  0.054 (0.003)*** 
Male  0.246 (0.021)*** 
Metro  0.078 (0.012)*** 
Experience  0.021 (0.002)*** 
Experience squared -0.0003 (0.0001)*** 
Lambda -0.124 (0.049)*** 
R-square  0.22 
F statistics 265.36 
Number of observations 5,497 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 5 presents the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of the 
bivariate probit model of labor force and welfare participation. Variables, which enter 
directly into the family budget constraint, include the nonlabor income and TANF 
benefits. Nonlabor income includes all nonwage family income excluding income from 
any transfer programs. As expected, nonlabor income has a statistically significant 
negative effect on labor and TANF participation. Predicted wage has a statistically 
significant negative effect on TANF participation and a positive effect on labor force 
participation. As expected, a higher unemployment rate makes it difficult to find jobs and 
thus has a statistically significant negative effect on labor market participation and a 
positive effect on welfare participation. Having younger children increases the 
probability of TANF participation and decreases the probability of labor market 
participation. A TANF benefit (pay standard) would be expected to increase the 
probability of TANF participation and decrease the probability of labor force 
participation. The result is consistent with this, and the effect of a TANF benefit on both 
TANF participation and labor force participation is statistically significant. 
Several variables are also included to capture the differences in taste and opportuni-
ties across families. The signs of these coefficients suggest that married families and  
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TABLE 5. Full information maximum likelihood estimates of the bivariate probit 
model 
Variables Labor Participation TANF Participation 
Intercept 0.255 (0.193) -0.089 (0.241) 
Married -0.172 (0.051)*** -0.943 (0.079)*** 
Male 1.010 (0.095)*** -0.435 (0.115)*** 
White 0.149 (0.046)*** -0.381 (0.055)*** 
Experience 0.005 (0.006)      - 
Experience squared -0.038 (0.011)***      - 
Kids6 -0.204 (0.028)*** 0.201 (0.032)*** 
Educy 0.025 (0.015) -0.009 (0.015) 
Nonlabor income -0.022 (0.028)*** -0.056 (0.007)*** 
Predicted wage   0.112 (0.029)*** -0.151 (0.031)*** 
Unemployment rate -0.084 (0.022)*** 0.056 (0.027)** 
Pay standard -0.040 (0.011)***   0.098 (0.014)*** 
BRR -0.030 (0.121) 0.143 (0.150) 
Rho (correlation coefficient)  -0.680 (0.022)*** 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
those whose family head is white are less likely to participate in TANF. White or male 
family heads are more likely to participate in the labor market while married family heads 
are less likely to work. Having children increases the probability of TANF participation 
and decreases the probability of labor market participation. 
The cross-equation correlation between the labor supply and TANF participation 
decisions is –0.68 and statistically significant. This is an indirect indication that the two 
decisions are related through the error term. 
Table 6 presents the estimates of marginal effects in the bivariate probit model. In 
the labor supply equation, being a married family head has the strongest negative effect 
and being a male-headed family has the strongest positive effect on the probability of 
labor market participation given TANF participation. The presence of one additional  
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TABLE 6. Marginal effects in the bivariate probit model 
 Direct Indirect Total Std. Error 
Labor supply 
Married 
 
-0.0843 
 
-0.2792 
 
-0.3636 
 
0.0266*** 
Male  0.4963 -0.1287  0.3676 0.0503*** 
White  0.0734 -0.1129 -0.0395 0.0234* 
Unemployment -0.0415 0.0165 -0.0249 0.0110** 
Experience  0.0027      0  0.0027 0.0027 
Experience squared -0.0188      0 -0.0188 0.0055*** 
Kids6 -0.1002  0.0337 -0.0406 0.0114*** 
Educy 0.0121 -0.0028 0.0094 0.0078 
Nonlabor income -0.0107 -0.0166 -0.0273 0.0028*** 
Wage  0.0550 -0.0448  0.0101 0.0156* 
Pay standard -0.0194 0.0423  0.0096 0.0056* 
BRR -0.0149 0.0423  0.0274 0.0619 
TANF participation 
Married 
 
-0.0423 
 
-0.0029 
 
-0.0452 
 
0.0047*** 
Male -0.0195  0.0170 -0.0025 0.0048 
White -0.0171  0.0025 -0.0146 0.0026*** 
Unemployment  0.0025 -0.0014  0.0011 0.0011 
Experience       0  0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 
Experience squared       0 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0002*** 
Kids6  0.0090 -0.0034  0.0056 0.0013*** 
Educy -0.0004 0.0004 0.00000 0.0007 
Nonlabor income -0.0025 -0.0004 -0.0029 0.0004*** 
Wage -0.0068  0.0019 -0.0049 0.0014*** 
Pay standard 0.0044 -0.0007 0.0037 0.0007*** 
BRR 0.0064 -0.0005 0.0059 0.0064 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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child under age 6 would decrease the probability of working by 4 percent. Nonlabor 
income has a significant negative effect and wages have a significant positive effect on 
the probability of working; both nonlabor income and wages have statistically significant 
negative effects on the probability of welfare participation. In the TANF participation 
equation, most variables seem to have relatively smaller effects on the probability of 
TANF participation given labor market participation. This implies that if family heads 
work, it makes relatively less difference whether or not they participate in TANF. 
The FIML estimates of the nested logit model are presented in Table 7. The 
estimated coefficients are interpreted with respect to the “no labor–no TANF  
 
TABLE 7. Full information maximum likelihood estimates of nested logit model 
Coefficients Estimates 
αyy 2.818 (10.894) 
αyn 3.687 (10.875) 
αny 1.187 (0.424)*** 
βb 0.040 (0.034) 
βr 0.001 (0.003) 
γW,l 0.060 (0.189) 
γW,t -0.263 (0.036)*** 
γM,l 0.891 (2.651) 
γM,t -1.481 (0.191)*** 
γC,l 0.035 (0.136) 
γC,t 0.271 (0.049)*** 
γN,l -0.115 (0.333) 
γN,t -0.117 (0.017)*** 
γU,l -0.099 (0.311) 
γU,t 0.065 (0.039)* 
IVwork 0.853 (2.486) 
IVno work 3.260 (0.772)*** 
Log likelihood -3707.024 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** 
Statistically significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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participation” category. Higher wages lead to less participation in TANF (γW,t) and, 
although not statistically significant, make family heads work more (γW,l). The 
coefficients on TANF benefits (βb) and BRR (βr) are not statistically significant. Male 
family heads tend to work more (γM,l) and participate less in TANF (γM,t). Families with 
more young children (under age 6) participate more in TANF(γC,t). Family heads with 
more unearned income participate less in TANF (γN,t) and, although not statistically 
significant, tend to work less (γN,l). The unemployment rate has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of TANF participation (γU,t). 
Elasticities for the relationship between the TANF benefit and wages and the 
probability of choosing alternative lt (labor supply and TANF participation) are reported 
in Table 8. A 10 percent increase in the pay standard will increase by 1.60 percent the 
probability of the choice to participate in the labor market and in TANF (L-T), while a 10 
percent increase in the wage will increase by 4.72 percent the probability of that choice. 
The elasticity with respect to the (predicted) wage is quite large in the choice in which the 
family has determined not to work and to participate in TANF (N-T). An increase in the 
wage by 10 percent decreases the probability of this choice (N-T) by 28.35 percent. This 
result suggests the importance of improved wages for moving families into the labor 
force and away from welfare program participation. 
 
TABLE 8. Elasticities of labor supply and TANF participation decisions with respect 
to pay standard and wages 
 Direct Elasticities 
Pay standard 
L-T  
 
0.160 
L-N 0.025 
N-T 0.261 
N-N 0.370 
Wages 
L-T 
 
0.472 
L-N 0.071 
N-T -2.835 
N-N n/a 
Notes: L-T is choice to work and to participate in TANF. L-N is choice to work and not to participate in 
TANF. N-T is choice not to work and to participate in TANF. N-N is choice not to work and not to 
participate in TANF. 
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Conclusions 
This study analyzes the labor force and welfare participation choices made by low-
wealth families and the effect of the 1996 welfare reform on the labor supply decisions of 
these families. Two models were estimated: the bivariate probit and the nested logit 
models. From the bivariate probit model we found evidence of endogeneity: the two 
choices (labor supply and program participation) are related through the error term, and 
the correlation is negative and statistically significant. 
The estimates from the nested logit model of the joint household choices indicate that 
higher wages increase labor force participation and decrease welfare program participation; 
an increase in nonlabor income decreases both labor and welfare participation. These 
results support strategies for improving wages and other nonlabor income for low-resource 
families as a means to reduce their reliance on welfare programs. 
  
Endnotes 
1. Maddala (1983) presents an extensive discussion of limited-dependent and 
qualitative-variable models in econometrics.  
2. The term ltB  is the maximum TANF grant per month; BRR is the benefit reduction 
rate, the rate at which additional dollars of earned income reduce the TANF benefit. 
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